The aim of this presentation will be to point out the difference between self-identification, i.e. identifying oneself with oneself as oneself, and identification, i.e. identifying oneself as someone or something, in light of the egological self-consciousness. Transcendental philosophy recognizes this distinction. For Kant, transcendental apperception results with “I think” or that “I am” the logical subject of my thoughts and representations. Without this synthetic unity of consciousness, “I would have as multicolored, diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious .” This condition of possibility for self-identification, albeit transcendental and formal, comprises the numerical identity both synchronous and diachronous. On the other hand, the “content” or “material” needs to be given in the empirical inner sense, i.e. “who” exactly am I, in which I “cognize myself only as I appear to myself”. This I is empty, contains no manifold in itself, and is always one and the same in every judgment, as the formal element of consciousness. A classic example of this is amnesia – I could wake up in a hospital, having lost all my memories (knowledge of my name, my life, the accident, etc.), but I would still be an “I”, and I would still refer to myself as the one who is lying in a hospital bed, unable to remember. In other words, I would be able to self-identify (I am I, this one, and not that one, e.g. the other patient lying in the bed next to mine), but I wouldn’t be able to identify myself. Sydney Shoemaker calls this ‘self-reference without identification’, and Andrew Brook ‘non-ascriptive reference to self ’. As an essential indexical , the I cannot be substituted with any description from a third-person point of view or with an object that is found in the world. This transcendental designation , the I, as an expression of self-consciousness, is devoid of all content , properties, and qualities – yet, it still retains its self-referential capability . In Brooks’ words, “awareness of properties as properties of oneself presupposes awareness of oneself as subject, as oneself.” Formulated in this way, self-consciousness is the basis (and condition of possibility) of self-knowledge because to be able to know anything about myself, I need to be aware that that knowledge refers to me. Only in this way, aphorism γνῶθι σεαυτόν is possible. The basic thesis of my presentation is that self-identification is a necessary prerequisite of each and every identification. In other words, to be able to know that property A is ‘my’ property, just as property B is, I ought to be able to identify myself with (or as) the subject of those properties. Each element of identification, according to Schütz and Kant, needs to correlate back to the subject (the I, ego), as does the whole. I am aware that in all elements of identification, it is one and the same person, and that that one and the same person is me, or am I. Without this, there would be no innate connection between “I have property A” and “I have property B” because both I’s (the I in each case) wouldn’t have immediate interrelation. This means that self-identification is a form of a necessary and structural tautology.
САМОИДЕНТИФИКАЦИЯ КАК АПРИОРНАЯ ОСНОВА ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ*
Целью данной работы является выявление различий между самоидентификацией, то есть отождествлением себя с самим собой как с самим собой, и идентификацией, то есть отождествлением себя с кем-то или чем-то, в свете эгологического самосознания. Трансцендентальная философия признает это различие. Для Канта трансцендентальная апперцепция приводит к следующему результату: “я мыслю” или “я есть” логический субъект моих мыслей и представлений. Без этого синтетического единства сознания [как указывал на это сам И. Кант] “я имел бы столь же пестрое разнообразное Я (Selbst), сколько у меня есть сознаваемых мной представлений.” Это условие возможности самоидентификации, пусть даже трансцендентальной и формальной, включает в себя числовое тождество как синхронное, так и диахронное. С другой стороны, “содержание” или “материал” должны быть даны в эмпирически внутреннем смысле , то есть “кто” именно я, в котором я “познаю себя только таким, каким я являюсь себе”. Это Я пусто, не содержит в себе многообразия и всегда одно и то же в каждом суждении, как формальный элемент сознания. Классическим примером этого является амнезия – я мог бы проснуться в больнице, потеряв все свои воспоминания (знание своего имени, своей жизни, несчастного случая и т. Д.), Но я все равно был бы “Я”, и я все еще называл бы себя тем, кто лежит на больничной койке, неспособный вспомнить. Другими словами, я мог бы самоидентифицировать себя (я-это я, а не тот, например, другой пациент, лежащий в соседней кровати), но я не смог бы идентифицировать себя. Сидни Шумейкер называет это "саморефлексией (self-reference) без идентификации", а Эндрю Брук- "не-аскриптивной отсылкой к себе". Как сущностный индексикал, Я не может быть заменено никаким описанием с точки зрения третьего лица или объектом, который находится в мире. Это трансцендентальное обозначение «Я» как выражение самосознания, лишеное всякого содержания, свойств и качеств, и все же оно сохраняет свою самореферентную способность . По словам Брукса, “осознание свойств как свойств самого себя предполагает осознание себя как субъекта, как самого себя.” Сформулированное таким образом, самосознание является основой (и условием возможности) самопознания, потому что для того, чтобы знать что-либо о себе, я должен осознавать, что это знание относится ко мне. Только так возможен афоризм γνῶθι σεαυτόν [познай самого себя]. Основной тезис моего выступления состоит в следующем: самоидентификация является необходимой предпосылкой любой идентификации. Другими словами, чтобы знать, что свойство А является "моим" свойством также как и свойство В, я должен быть способен отождествлять себя с (или как) субъектом этих свойств. Каждый элемент идентификации, согласно Шютцу и Канту, должен соотноситься с субъектом (Я, эго), как и целое. Я осознаю, что во всех элементах отождествления это один и тот же человек, и что этот один и тот же человек это Я. Без этого не было бы никакой врожденной связи между “У меня есть свойство А” и “У меня есть свойство В”, потому что оба Я (Я в каждом случае) не имели бы непосредственной взаимосвязи. Это означает, что самоидентификация является формой необходимой и структурной тавтологии.
*данный текст является переводом. Оригинальный текст тезисов располагается во вкладке "English"
Dear Mr Andrija. Your theses were very useful to me.
I am doing research on identity. The idea of a holistic self, self-identity, from a philosophical point of view, is very close to me. It makes it possible to consider the components of identity as separate elements of the whole.
Уважаемый господин Andrija. Ваши тезисы были мне очень полезны.
Я занимаюсь исследованиями идентичности. Идея целостного я, самоидентичности, с философской точки зрения мне очень близка. Она дает возможность рассматривать компоненты идентичности как отдельные элементы целого.
Dear Ms. Gudzovskaya,
I’m happy to hear that you found my abstract useful for your research. I would also agree with you that components of identity could (and should) be viewed as separable elements of the whole and that the self (or the I) needs to be able to recognize itself in each separate element.
Thank you for sharing this interesting paper proposal! Your point about the necessity of self-identification for identification is compelling. If you are familiar with Martin Heidegger’s work in «Being and Time,» can we conceptualize self-identification as you understand it in terms of Heidegger’s notion of ‘mineness’ (i.e., in terms of his claim that the being of Dasein is in each case mine)?
Unfortunately, I must admit that I’m not quite familiar with Heideggers’ work. (As far as I can tell) On one side, we could conceptualize it that way, because everything that is a part of my identity (or even being, in this sense) must, by definition, be «mine». As Kant puts it, «I think» must be able to follow all my representations, for otherwise, they would be nothing for me.
(For example, if someone says that I did something while I was sleepwalking — for that to be, so to speak, a genuine «part of me», I need to be able to be conscious of that fact; conversely, that is a «part of me» in a secondary sense — a fact, or something I have done unconsciously, or part of my body, etc.).
On the other hand, I am closer to a strong «intellectual» or «reflective» conception of a subject, like Descartes, Kant, or Husserl, rather than being-in-the-world of Heidegger. Therefore, I would agree with Husserl’s critique of Heidegger, that his philosophy lacks a strong transcendental subject that is, so to speak, «above» being — non-being (me-on), or the one who constitutes being. In that sense, a problem arises: what is this ‘mine’ whose being of Dasein is? In other words, even if I say, for example: «My being…», I necessarily differentiate between «Me» and «(my) being». Now, of course, this difference doesn’t have to be ontological (I am my being) but is an epistemological one. Sartre raises this distinction in his concept of pour-soi, but he also has that problem of «two I’s» — the reflective and reflected I (or I who am thinking and I about whom I’m thinking).
I hope that somewhat answers your question. (Again, I’m sorry for not being familiar with Heidegger’s philosophy. That’s why I’m interested in hearing your presentation 🙂 ).
Dear Andrija Jurić,
Your paperis very interesting. Like Gudzovskaya, I believe it helps my research. As you read in my article, I am currently studying Andy Clark’s thesis on an extended and predictive mind, along with the theses of 4e cognition in general. And his formulations of the self and personal identity continue to intrigue me with regard to the question of the apparent «dissolution of the self» in the world. It seems to me that the issue of the «first person perspective» (which I understand basically as the same thing you named as «self-awareness») is essential to address this problem, given the difficulty of promoting such «dissolution» and at the same time accounting that perspective.
Dear Amanda Stroparo,
I agree with you completely! I came across the same problem, but coming from the «other side», i.e. the I, or ego, or self-consciousness. As Husserl and Sartre were first (to my knowledge) to point out that there «is no I/ego» when we are «immersed» in the world. And just as you, I find the dissolution of the self a difficulty for promoting my «first-person perspective», i.e. «egoic» theory of consciousness! 😀 As Sartre gives an example: while I’m reading a book, there is «no me (I)», because I am «in-the-book» (or in-the-world), amongst the characters or events; but, on the other side, I can always «recollect» myself in self-reflection and say: «I am reading a book».
The main problem (as I see it) is how can ‘I’ «disappear» and yet, still be there and, at the same time «reappear»? In other words, consciousness continues to be ego-consciousness, even when there is no ego explicitly.
Exactly! This is exactly what most intrigues me too! You really described my anguish. When you said that «consciousness continues to be ego-consciousness, even when there is no ego explicitly», I could not have expressed it better.
Maybe someday we’ll meet in the middle!
It’s amazing to find a fellow researcher who shares the same topic of interest (and specific problematics)! It’s actually the topic of my PhD dissertation (philosophical egology).
And I hope so too! Best solutions (I daren’t say answers) are usually found in the middle, not extremes.
This was very interesting and thought provoking, thank you.
You say, I think sensibly, «to be able to know that property A is ‘my’ property, just as property B is, I ought to be able to identify myself with (or as) the subject of those properties». However, does the ability to identify myself as not the subject of a property C inform or influence my ability to self-identify? To put it slightly differently: is self-identification not just a necessary but a sufficient prerequisite for «each and every identification»?
If I understood you correctly (and I apologize if I haven’t), you are asking if not being able to identify with property C can influence the ability to self-identify?
— I would answer that no, it doesn’t, because self-identification is «formal» or «logical», so to say, «part» of consciousness. It is, in Kant’s terms, pure and empty. Then, if I’m not able to identify myself as the subject of property C, I’m still self-identifying with that subject. The self-identification «part» is already contained in this «myself» part of the sentence.
And for the question is self-identification a sufficient prerequisite for identification — I would say that it isn’t, because identification also implies the «empirical» part (knowledge of property C as belonging or not to me).
Self-identification would only mean that I am aware that it is me/myself of whom I’m speaking as having or not property C. This claim implies that self-knowledge and self-consciousness are two different aspects because I can have correct self-knowledge (one which is true), without «realizing» that it is me, of whom I know something.